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Abstract
As regards labour-market reform and employment policies, the European Union 
currently  touts  the  concept  of  ‘flexicurity’,  aiming  at  simultaneously  enhancing 
both flexibility and security in the labour market in response to the globalisation 
of the economy and far-reaching demographic developments such as the ageing of 
the population. Each Member State is expected to map out its own distinct pathway 
towards more flexicurity and the European Commission has, for its part, suggested 
a set of four general pathways. Therefore a need exists for ideas and examples on 
how to elaborate a flexicurity pathway, looking for inspiration rather than imitation. 
In  the  Netherlands,  a  government-appointed  Committee  on  Labour  Market 
Participation (the so-called Bakker Committee) has recently published proposals 
and recommendations for further reform of the Dutch labour market. This paper 
discusses that part of these proposals involving a particular flexicurity pathway 
towards better transition security and higher labour-market mobility. This possible 
pathway, now being debated in the Netherlands, may also be of interest to other 
Member States.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
One of the main challenges the European Union is currently facing is how to live up, 
in the era of globalisation and ageing, to European citizens’ expectations of providing 
a distinct European Social Model (Begg, Draxler and Mortensen 2008). Can a true 
alternative be offered to sheer flexibilisation, deregulation and the degradation of 
social standards and social cohesion? Will a strong social Europe also be a strong 
economic  Europe?  Can  Europe  indeed  have  its  own  labour-market  institutions 
distinct from the rest of the world (Blanchard 2006, Giddens 2007, Silva Peneda and 
Albino De Rossa 2006)?1
At the European level, the expressed desire to maintain a balance between social 
and economic goals. The pressing question is how the European Social Model should 
be further developed in a concrete manner. As of 2006 this challenging question 
has been specifically dealt with under the heading of ‘flexicurity’. The objective of 
flexicurity strategies is to combine employment and income security with flexibility 
in labour markets, work organisation and labour relations. This approach should 
transcend the simple trade-off between flexibility and security, where the former is 
seen to be in the exclusive interest of the employer and the latter is seen to be the 
exclusive concern of the employee. In a flexicurity strategy, flexibility and security 
should  not  be  seen  as  conflicting  aspects  of  labour-market  arrangements,  but  as 
mutually supportive components of a well-functioning labour market. Flexicurity 
policy-making calls for a ‘recalibration’ of the welfare state (Ferrera, hemerijck and 
Rhodes 2000, Ferrera and hemerijck 2003).
Although formulated at the European level, for several reasons the flexicurity 
approach has to be developed into concrete policies and regulations at the Member 
State  level.  First,  in  view  of  the  substantial  differences  in  country  practices  and 
challenges, the EU rightfully does not believe in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (see also 
Maydell et al 2006:131, Pacelli et al 2008). Second, the EU has to respect, under its 
Treaty, the autonomy of each Member State has regarding labour market and social 
policies. Therefore the European Commission has recently proposed a set of four 
different flexicurity pathways, addressing the distinct challenges faced by Member 
States.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the 
concept of flexicurity pathways and the concrete ways in which this concept can be 
applied. Section 3 investigates the Dutch achievements and challenges in the area 
of flexicurity. On the basis of recommendations of a recent government-appointed 
advisory group on labour-market reform, section 4 discusses concrete labour-market 
1  Evidently, similar questions are being posed in other parts of the world. See the recent report by the 
US Congressional Research Service (Ahearn 2008) on Globalisation, Worker Insecurity and Policy 
Approaches.On the Road to Flexicurity
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reforms that elaborate one particular flexicurity pathway, namely the pathway towards 
better transition security and higher labour market mobility. The final section (section 
5) draws some conclusions, with regard to the relevance and applicability of the 
proposals of the Dutch committee to countries other than the Netherlands.
2.  EUROPEAN FLExICURITy PAThWAyS
With the aim of offering suggestions to Member States for mapping out their flexicurity 
policies, the European Commission has included a set of flexicurity pathways in the 
Communication on Flexicurity, taking into account the work of the European Expert 
Group on Flexicurity.2 These distinct pathways follow from ideal-typical situations, 
one or more of which might be thought relevant to the Member States. The labour-
market situations are:
1.  Bifurcated, two-tier labour markets with a large share of so-called ‘outsiders’ 
who lack income and employment security as well as the opportunity to make 
the transition to more permanent employment, paralleled by strict regulation of 
open-ended contracts for the so-called ‘insiders’;
2.  Labour  markets  featuring  relatively  limited  dynamism  with  a  large  share  of 
workers who enjoy high job security but lack sufficient opportunities to find new 
employment in the event of redundancy;
3.  Labour markets that are sufficiently dynamic but suffer from opportunity and 
skills gaps, which may curb productivity growth;
4.  Labour  markets  offering  insufficient  opportunities  to  groups  that  are  outside 
the formal labour market due to benefit dependence or involvement in informal 
work.
Four ideal-typical pathways match these situations. As all Member States neither 
share exactly the same challenges nor are expected to take precisely the same steps, 
the pathways should be considered as indicative. Thus, it is up to the Member States 
to consider the relevance of all the suggested flexicurity pathways to their own actual 
context and conditions, taking proper notice of the different institutional, political 
and cultural settings and histories. The concept of flexicurity pathways indicates 
that countries can take different roads to improve the functioning of their labour 
2  ‘Flexicurity Pathways: Turning hurdles into Stepping-Stones’, published on 27 June 2007, available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/pdf/flexi_pathways_en.pdf.  See 
also Wilthagen, T. (2008) Mapping out Flexicurity Pathways in the European Union. Available 
at the website of the ILO Training Centre Turin http://zope298.itcilo.org/delta/hld2008/hld/en/
thematical-papers/mapping-out-flexicurity-pathways-in-the-european-union  as  well  as  here: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118725.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
328  Intersentia
markets, based on country-specific challenges, priorities and possibilities. Indeed, the 
concept of distinct pathways signals that the EU is well aware that different countries 
face different challenges. Such variety and diversity of welfare states across Europe is 
documented by many studies (hall and Soskice 2001, Whitley 2000, Arts and Gelissen 
2002, Esping-Andersen 1990, Sapir 2005). This variety is linked to historical choices 
based on distinct cultural and value systems leading to different economic and social 
institutions. As part of this institutional and cultural variety, different modalities 
of flexicurity, i.e. different combinations of flexibility and security, can be observed 
across the EU (Philips and Eamets 2007, European Commission 2006, 2007). To some 
extent, these modalities of flexicurity can be considered functional equivalents, with 
the diversity originating in the distinct national styles of regulation or social regimes 
that have emerged over the years (Cazes and Nesporava 2007). Since flexicurity can 
take different forms from country to country, Member States and social partners 
should  assess  their  own  particular  situation  and  identify  their  own  meaningful 
flexicurity pathways to cope with their specific labour-market challenges.
The  flexicurity  policies  can  be  designed  and  implemented  across  four  policy 
components defined by the Commission, which may be mutually supportive. These 
four components are:
1.  Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements;
2.  Efficient active labour market policies (ALMP) to strengthen transition security;
3.  Systematic and responsive lifelong learning;
4.  Modern  social  security  provisions  that  also  facilitate  mobility  in  the  labour 
market.
Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that a general precondition for successfully 
operating such a flexicurity system is a supportive and productive social dialogue 
(European Social Partners 2007).
We now turn to a description of the four ideal-typical pathways identified by 
the European Commission. For a complete overview of all the policy suggestions 
corresponding to each ideal-typical pathway, we refer to the report of the Flexicurity 
Expert Group.
Flexicurity pathway 1: dealing with flexibility at the margin
The  first  pathway  addresses  the  issue  of  flexibility  at  the  margins  of  the  labour 
market. It aims to reduce asymmetries between standard and non-standard work by 
promoting upward transitions in the labour market and by integrating non-standard 
contracts fully into labour law, collective agreements, social security and lifelong-
learning systems. Alternatively, standard contracts could be made more attractive On the Road to Flexicurity
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to companies by introducing an open-ended contract in which specific elements of 
protection are built up progressively with time, until ‘full’ protection is eventually 
achieved. Such a contract guarantees basic but adequate protection from the start but 
then builds up more protection as the working relationship continues. Social partners 
and governments should negotiate the terms of these arrangements.
Flexicurity pathway 2: securing transitions from job to job
The second pathway emphasises safe and successful job-to-job transitions. Built-in 
contractual guarantees and human resource management (hRM) policies should 
ensure  timely  transitions  into  new  jobs  in  either  the  same  company  or  another 
company.  To  help  reduce  unemployment,  employers,  social  partners  and  public 
employment services may provide individualised transition facilities to redundant 
workers.  Moreover,  a  strong  system  of  lifelong  learning  and  vocational  training 
may constitute the basis for productive labour-market transitions inside and outside 
companies. Such a system should allow for quick access to effective training funds 
and facilities at the branch level if the need arises. Within this pathway, strengthening 
internal flexicurity is also relevant, especially to enhance the employability and skills 
of workers.
In the Dutch case, as we will argue below, the institutions for providing transition 
security can be strengthened, turning them into more wide-spread facilities that are 
not limited to employees of large firms that can afford outplacement and retraining, 
but are also available to other workers.
Flexicurity pathway 3: access to learning and good transitions for all
This pathway recommends strengthening investment in skills and R&D. In this way, 
the opportunities for employment and income security for specific groups in the 
labour market can be enhanced and productivity growth can be boosted. A wide-
ranging approach is required to keep the labour market accessible to low-skilled 
workers and other groups at risk, such as minorities, older workers, women and early 
school leavers. This helps to prevent long-term unemployment and to combat other 
forms of social exclusion. This pathway benefits from binding agreements at branch 
or regional level that address the flexibility needs of both employers and workers as 
well as strategies for better investment in training. Where the institutional structures 
for such agreements are not yet in place, support from the social partners and the 
government is needed.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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Flexicurity pathway 4: comprehensive social security supporting transitions to 
regular work
This pathway starts out from the urgent need to increase the employment and job 
opportunities  of  persons  who  are  currently  receiving  social  security  benefits  or 
working in the informal sector. Active labour market policies (ALMP) and social 
security should offer sufficient opportunities and incentives, in terms of increased 
conditionality of benefits for example, to return to work in the formal sector. Long-
term welfare dependence could thus be prevented. Informal work can be regularised 
by offering flexi-secure contracts, lower payroll taxes and a skills perspective (i.e. one 
that aims to raise the training and productivity levels of the workers) to employers 
and workers operating in the informal sector. The formalisation of informal economic 
activities can help raise financial resources for building up a more comprehensive 
social  security  system.  This  requires  the  development  of  a  stronger  institutional 
capacity. Among other things, social partners need to be encouraged to negotiate key 
elements of working conditions while labour market and benefit institutions should 
co-operate better. Social dialogue can be further developed at sector and regional 
level and both bipartite and tripartite dialogue can be strengthened.
3.  FLExICURITy AChIEVEMENTS AND ChALLENGES IN 
ThE NEThERLANDS
3.1.  ThE ‘NORMALISATION’ OF ATyPICAL WORK
At the national level, many Member States have developed various labour market 
initiatives and reforms over the past decade that could qualify as flexicurity strategies 
i.e. they have adopted an integrative view on flexibility and security.3 The Netherlands 
often serves as an example (European Commission 2006). Dutch flexicurity policies 
have been developed rather deliberately and aim at the normalisation of atypical work 
while preserving flexibility in the labour market. This approach, codified, among 
other things, in the Flexibility and Security Act and in collective labour agreements 
for the temporary work agency sector, served as an example at the European level in 
the early stages of the flexicurity policy-making process. The Dutch labour market 
has also performed well during the past two decades. In 2007, the Netherlands had an 
employment rate of 74.3 per cent and an unemployment rate of 3.2 per cent, compared 
to 64.5 per cent and 7.1 per cent respectively in the 27 EU Member States (EU27).4 
3  Many more examples of flexicurity practices in the 27 Member States can be found in the report 
of the Rapporteur of the European Expert Group on Flexicurity, titled Flexicurity Practices (June 
2007). See Wilthagen (2007).
4  All figures presented in this section are based on Eurostat calculations.On the Road to Flexicurity
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In recent years, economic growth has been modest to good (2.3 per cent is expected 
for 2008) while inflation has been rather low (between 2003 and 2006 prices in the 
Netherlands increased by 4.8 per cent, whereas the average in the Eurozone amounted 
to 6.9 per cent5).
As regards the first component of flexicurity (i.e. flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements), the Dutch labour market is characterised by substantial contractual 
diversity, including part-time work, fixed-term work and agency work, all aspects of 
the first component of flexicurity. In 2006, 46 per cent of the employed labour force 
worked part-time (compared to only 18 per cent in the EU27). Working part-time is 
even regarded as a normal and desired type of employment, which is illustrated by the 
high share of part-time workers who report that they voluntarily work in this type of 
employment. Women especially work part-time (75 per cent in NL compared to 31 
per cent in the EU27 in 2006). Whereas this type of employment allows women to 
combine work, care and leisure, in the long run it tends to harm their career prospects 
and wage levels (Román 2006). The proportion of employees with a contract of limited 
duration was 18.1 per cent in 2007 (14.5 per cent in the EU27).
Security  for  these  ‘atypical’  workers  is  provided  in  several  ways,  notably  by 
strictly applying, by law, the pro rata temporis principle to part-time workers (Visser, 
Wilthagen, Beltzer and Koot-van der Putte 2004). This holds true not only for the 
position of the employee under civil law, but also for social security legislation and 
entitlements. Two laws are in particular relevant to part-time workers, but also to 
fixed-term workers: the Prohibition of Discrimination by Working hours Act (Wet 
Verbod Onderscheid Arbeidsduur, WVOA) and the Adjustment of Working hours Act 
(Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur, WAA).
3.2.  REMAINING FLExICURITy ChALLENGES
3.2.1.  Integrating Low-Skilled Workers
Notwithstanding  these  developments,  the  Netherlands  should  not  be  regarded  a 
flexicurity paradise or utopia. Like any country, the Netherlands does face various 
employment challenges and should map out its own further pathway with the necessary 
steps for improvement. First, regulations and policies can be improved in order to 
strengthen the positions of specific vulnerable groups that have a hard time entering 
and progressing in the labour market, such as ethnic minorities and low-skilled 
workers. Although unemployment among non-western non-nationals has decreased 
significantly during the recent upswing in economic activity, the unemployment rate 
of 9.1 per cent is still almost three times higher than the unemployment rate for Dutch 
5  Source: Eurostat and Statistics Netherlands (CBS).Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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nationals.6 In the 15–25 years age group the unemployment rate amounts to 15 per 
cent for non-western non-nationals and 8.1 per cent for nationals. School dropout is 
a serious problem, particularly among ethnic minorities. One in eight young people 
leave school without a basic qualification, which complicates the transition from 
school to work. About 10 per cent of the population has very low literacy skills so that 
they are functionally illiterate. The training system does not yet adequately facilitate 
combinations of work and training, especially for those workers who prefer to learn 
on the job rather than in a formal educational setting. An adequate infrastructure 
for implementing life-long learning on the work floor is still lacking. The resulting 
training deficits harm labour-market prospects.
3.2.2. Overcoming Duality in Employment Protection
The Dutch system of dismissal protection is fairly strict for insiders and more relaxed 
for outsiders in the labour market (Deelen, Jongen and Visser 2006). This means that 
companies may seek alternative ways to increase their external flexibility, usually by 
hiring additional workers on temporary contracts or via employment agencies. These 
flexible work forces are often representatives from more vulnerable groups, such as 
young people, ethnic minorities and the low skilled. Especially if these people cannot 
make a timely transition to more permanent forms of employment, they may profit 
less  from  some  social  security  provisions  (pensions)  and  securities  attached  to  a 
permanent job (e.g. access to training) (Vielle and Walthery 2003). This indicates a 
structural problem in the Dutch labour market: permanent staff are too permanent 
and ‘flexible employees’ (flexi-workers and self-employed persons) are not permanent 
enough. For both groups, there is too little investment in employability. Permanent 
employees face insufficient incentives to boost their employability and to tackle new 
challenges. As regards employees on a flexible contract, employers do not invest much 
in their employability. This imbalance has a negative effect on the level of motivation 
and productivity within the labour force.
3.2.3. Self-Employment
Another phenomenon, often associated with the strictness of employment protection 
legislation  and  regulation,  from  the  perspective  of  both  companies  and  workers, 
is  the  steady  rise  of  self-employed  workers.  The  total  Dutch  working  population 
consist of almost 7.8 million people. It is estimated that currently nearly 1 million 
6  Data from Statistics Netherlands based on the national definition of unemployment, which differs 
from the international Eurostat definition. The main difference is that Statistics Netherlands regards 
a person as unemployed only if a person is actively looking for a job of at least 12 hours a week. The 
authors thank Sonja Bekker of Tilburg University  for collecting relevant statistics included in this 
section.On the Road to Flexicurity
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workers conduct their activities outside the traditional employment relationship. In 
the construction sector for example, the number of self-employed (i.e. own-account) 
workers has increased by 31 per cent over the past two years.7 Below, when dealing 
with reform proposals, we will return to the position of the self-employed.
3.2.4. Older Workers
Older workers constitute an especially vulnerable group. Although older workers 
that have been working for the same employers for a large number of years enjoy 
good labour conditions, they generally lack sufficient transition and employment 
security. In particular, if their jobs are at risk, e.g. in cases of restructuring, they lack 
the security and ability to make a timely transition to another job. Reintegration back 
into the labour market in the case of unemployment or disability is disproportionately 
hard for older workers. To illustrate, only 14 per cent of all the people aged over 55 
who become unemployed are able to find work again within one year.
Job mobility for older workers is very low, in part because these workers typically 
lose  a  lot  of  their  tenure-based  employment  protection  if  they  move  to  another 
employer. In part due to non-portable employment protection, elderly workers are 
tied with ‘golden chains’ to their employer, even if they are no longer motivated and 
would therefore prefer a new challenge in another job. This obstacle to transitions 
to more productive job opportunities harms productivity of human capital. This 
becomes increasingly problematic in an ageing society.8 It also hurts training and 
schooling because workers often learn the most when they start a new job. Dutch 
companies are lagging behind in investing in the skills and retraining of their older 
workers compared to young workers. Whereas half of the Dutch employees in the age 
categories 16–24 and 25–34 years took part in education or training for their job or 
profession between 2004–2006, only 30 per cent of the workers aged 55–64 could say 
the same.9
The lack of employability of older workers contributes to early retirement. The 
employment rate of the older generation was a low 21 per cent in 2006 for the group 
aged 60–65 years.10 Most of the people in this group are either in early retirement 
arrangements, or, often in the case of women, left the labour market decades ago when 
they married and started a family. Developments such as these call for a general and 
effective system of transition and employment security, not limited to large firms that 
already operate mobility centres and the like.
7  Source: Statistics Netherlands.
8  A recent study on job mobility in Europe confirms that both too little and too much job mobility is 
detrimental. It is also reported that some evidence exists that employing workers with 4–10 years of 
job tenure has the most favorable impact on productivity (Andersen et al 2008).
9  Data: Institute for Labour Studies (OSA), Tilburg, the Netherlands.
10  Data from Statistics Netherlands.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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3.2.5. A More Efficient Use of Female Labour Supply
A third urgent concern in the Dutch context is the dearth of career opportunities for 
women, including pay gaps and the lack of women in the top management of companies 
and institutions. Even when their children are older, women continue to work in 
part-time jobs with few career possibilities. Transitions from part-time to full-time 
employment thus seem rather difficult for people who experience transitions in their 
care obligations at home. To facilitate these transitions, employers should offer more 
flexible working careers so that men and women alike can invest in the human capital 
of their children without depreciating their own human capital. Companies still very 
much aim their career systems at full-time male workers who can devote themselves 
their entire working life full-time to their career. The limited possibilities for older 
women to move on to well-paid, productive jobs are also related to the rigidities in the 
labour market for elderly workers. Female workers who want to return full-time to the 
labour market at age 45 are often stuck in jobs that do not exploit their full potential. 
Indeed, as described above, employers do not invest a lot in the human capital of 
workers who have passed the age of 50.
The inadequate exploitation of female human capital in the Dutch labour market, 
if not a waste of investment, still harms the volume of labour supply (in terms of 
hours and persons) and the productivity of the Dutch labour force. The resulting 
lack of female labour supply threatens the economic and financial sustainability of 
the welfare state in an ageing society. This threat applies especially to the services 
provided by labour-intensive education and health sectors, which rely rather heavily 
on female workers. The facilitation of transitions from part-time to full-time work 
aimed at a better reconciliation of work and family over the life course constitutes a 
major challenge to the Dutch flexicurity system (for an overview of all such issues see 
OECD 2007). The same applies to better maintenance and utilisation of female human 
capital.
This analysis of the problems faced by the Dutch labour market neatly matches the 
European Commission’s recommendations for the Netherlands, among which are to 
facilitate the transition from part-time to full-time work, reduce the gender pay gap, 
combat early school leaving, and raise labour supply. The OECD and the IMF have 
recently put forward similar suggestions (IMF 2008, and OECD 2007).
The Netherlands can seek inspiration from more than one of the ‘typical’ pathways 
proposed by the European Commission. In particular, pathway 3 appears relevant 
in view of the difficulties that specific groups are experiencing in the Dutch labour 
market. Also pathway 1 applies, as the Netherlands must avoid further segmentation 
in the labour market, resulting in a growing gap between insiders and outsiders. This 
paper, however, focuses on a possible elaboration of the second pathway by promoting 
transition  security,  firms’  adaptability  and  labour-market  mobility.  Arguably,  the 
adequate designing and stipulation of the second pathway also addresses some of the On the Road to Flexicurity
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challenges that are at the core of the other three pathways. In particular, transition 
security will help outsiders in the labour market and people not yet participating in 
the labour market in (re)entering the formal labour market and making progress in 
terms of upward mobility.
4.  PROPOSALS FOR ENhANCING TRANSITION  
SECURITy AND LABOUR MARKET MOBILITy IN  
ThE NEThERLANDS
In the Netherlands the Committee on Labour Market Participation (also known 
as the Bakker Committee)11 has recently published (June 2008) its proposals and 
recommendations for raising the labour market participation rate to 80 per cent by 
2016. The Committee was installed in the wake of a vigorous political struggle over 
the reform of the Dutch employment protection legislation in order to resolve the 
resulting deadlock that had nearly led to the fall of the coalition government. The 
Committee, which comprised independent labour-market experts from the public 
sector, the private sector and academia, was asked to explore all possible options 
for enhancing labour market participation. The report suggests ways to reform the 
Dutch labour market system while at the same time alleviating workers’ feelings of 
insecurity about the risk of losing their job. The Committee’s report advocates a three-
track approach. The first track pertains to the necessity of facilitating and stimulating, 
as soon as possible, weak groups to get a job or to work more hours. The proposals here 
might be considered less innovative, as they originate in a broad consensus among 
labour market experts (and build on existing or former policies in the Netherlands), 
but they are nonetheless important. Basically this track represents a sticks and carrots 
approach for all parties involved. It is proposed that employers should be encouraged 
to hire long-term benefit recipients on the basis of temporary wage costs subsidies, a so-
called ‘no risk policy’ and secondment arrangements. Benefit recipients, in their turn, 
will have a participation obligation and part-time workers will be stimulated through 
tax incentives to extend the number of working hours. At the same time, facilities for 
combining work and family are being improved, including career, working-time and 
child care arrangements.
The second track includes the proposal to raise the official pension age as of 2016 
(by one month per year) in line with the population’s growing life expectancy. The 
goal is to counteract the decline of the labour supply, caused by a shrinking working 
population. Currently, residents in the Netherlands are entitled to a state pension at 
the age of 65. The recommended reform would gradually raise this age to 67 by no 
later than 2040.
11  One of the authors of this paper has served as a member of this Committee.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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4.1.  DESIGNING A FLExICURITy LABOUR MARKET SySTEM
The most innovative ‘flexicurity’ aspects of the advocated reforms are entailed in a 
third track of proposals. This track might well be considered the more fundamental 
track as it directly affects the fundamentals of the labour market. Its goal is to improve 
the operation of the labour market, thereby enhancing the productivity of human 
resources, employment security and the employability of the labour force. The second 
track  is  also  expected  to  contribute  to  a  more  competitive,  innovative  economy. 
Indeed, innovation is associated with creative destruction and thus demands a lot 
from the capability of workers to adjust to new circumstances. The social legitimacy 
of policy also increases, if a well-functioning labour market offers adequate security 
during the transition period between jobs.
The approach also ensures that the employment gains produced through the first 
track are in fact sustainable without substantial public spending on wage subsidies. 
As regards the second track, by enhancing the employability of older workers and the 
operation of the labour market for these workers, the third track helps to raise the 
effective retirement age in the future in line with increased longevity.
The  basic  philosophy  of  the  third  track  is  to  give  employers,  employees  and 
municipalities  at  a  decentralised  level  more  responsibility  for  employability  and 
transitional security of workers. Additional decentralised responsibility is matched 
with additional instruments for these decentralised parties to work on employability 
and employment security.
This policy has two main elements:
4.1.1.  Employment Insurance
The first proposal is to turn the current Unemployment Insurance Scheme into an 
Employment Insurance scheme, geared towards the prevention of unemployment 
and a smooth transition to a new job.12 Employers are required to continue to pay 
80 to 100 per cent of the worker’s payment for a maximum of six months after giving 
notice to the worker. During this so-called transfer period the worker can fully devote 
himself or herself to finding new employment. If this time span does not suffice, the 
worker is dismissed, but not before the efforts of both the employer and worker have 
been evaluated. The worker then enters a re-integration scheme where the sector of 
industry bears the financial responsibility and where private or public re-integration 
organisations can be relied upon. After another six months and if a new job still has 
12  The concept of employment insurance (EI), replacing traditional unemployment insurance (UI) has 
been  advocated in the literature notably by the German scholar  Guenther Schmid. In his recent 
book (Schmid 2008:253) he states that ‘(…) the increasing variety of employment risks requires a 
move from UI centred on income security for jobless people to a system of employment Insurance 
(EI) centred on job-to-job security.’ For empirical evidence see Muffels et al. (2008).On the Road to Flexicurity
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not been obtained, the responsibility is shifted towards the municipality. The exact 
benefit levels of the second and third period are still to be discussed, but the second 
period might match the current unemployment benefit level of 75 per cent of last 
earned income.
In this new system, the employer also gains as employment protection legislation 
is eased through the abolishment of the current pre-emptive testing of dismissals, 
conducted by the public employment services.13 At the same time, during the notice 
period, the worker can go to the courts to challenge the reason the employer gives 
for the prospective dismissal14 but this notice period is shortened to only one month. 
Moreover,  as  indicated  above,  a  gate-keeper  (probably  the  public  labour  office) 
evaluates the efforts of the employer to help the worker find a new job during the 
transfer period.
The idea of putting more emphasis on attaching a price to laying off people, 
rather than on legal procedures that depend on the form of contract, is consistent 
with economic theory (see for example Blanchard and Tirole 2008, Deelen, Jongen 
and Visser 2006). The requirement to continue to pay the wage of a worker during 
the transfer period can be viewed as an element of own risk for the employer in 
unemployment insurance. Blanchard and Tirole (2008) show that such an element 
induces the firm to internalise the cost of unemployment and take efficient layoff 
decisions.15 It encourages employers to prevent lay offs and lengthy spells of involuntary 
unemployment. This prevention can involve investing in the employability of workers. 
It can also involve facilitating voluntary transfers to other employers of those workers 
who still happen to become redundant. Indeed, employers face incentives to help 
13  The Dutch system of dismissal regulation is of a pre-emptive or preventive nature and its also allows 
employers to chose between two channels for pursuing dismissals: either they should go to the 
public employment services (CWI; this procedure was established during the Second World War) 
or they file a request at the lower courts (kantonrechter). In both cases the labour contract cannot 
be legally terminated before a permit (or in the case of the courts, rescission) has been granted. The 
courts (not the CWI) have the power to decide on severance pay for the employee. For this matter, 
the association of lower court judges has developed a particular formula to calculate the amount 
of payment, taking into account tenure and wages of the employee and the nature of the dismissal 
(especially whether the employer or employee is to blame). One monthly salary per year of tenure 
is the standard level of severance pay, but it can be raised according to the circumstances of the 
dismissal. Flexible workforces not on open-ended contracts are currently excluded from severance 
pay.
14  Social partners can agree in private collective labour agreements on various requirements the 
employers must meet before they can lay off workers and the procedure employers need to follow in 
the case of lay offs.
15  They also show that, implicit in this, the optimal size of the lay-off tax required to paid to an 
unemployed worker should be less than the total income paid to the worker, if one takes account of 
the limited capability of firms to absorb the unemployment risk. Bearing this risk may be especially 
burdensome for small firms. That is why the Bakker Committee puts forward several proposals to 
limit the risks for small businesses.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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redundant workers find another job and to set up efficient institutions and procedures 
for offering more transition security.
4.1.2.  Work Budget
The second element is the introduction of a so-called Work Budget that replaces 
the current Dutch Life Course Savings scheme and another tax-favoured employee 
savings system.
The present Life Course Savings scheme, which came into force in January 2006, 
contains the following key provisions:
1.  Employees  may  save  a  maximum  of  12  per  cent  of  yearly  gross  income  to  a 
maximum of 210 per cent of the yearly gross income, in order to finance periods of 
unpaid leave, e.g. care leave, sabbatical, terminal care, parental leave, training leave 
or early retirement. After the take up, the account can be refilled up to the 210 per 
cent. A maximum of 3 years leave could be saved for, if the employee decides that 
70 per cent of his or her wage is sufficient, but after 18 months the social insurance 
coverage expires. An employee that insists on 100 per cent of his or her wage will 
be able to finance a maximum leave period of 2.1 years;
2.  Money can be put in a life course saving account or used as premium for life course 
insurance (at private insurance companies, pension funds etc.). In agreement with 
the employer, overtime can also be saved in the account.
No new rights to leave were introduced in addition to the existing rights; the Life 
Course Savings scheme is first and foremost a fiscally stimulated arrangement to 
save money to be used during certain periods of leave (especially non-paid leave) or 
inactivity. Collective bargaining parties are expected to incorporate and facilitate the 
Life Course Savings scheme in their agreements and employers are obliged to offer the 
Life Course Savings scheme to their employees. So far participation rates within the 
scheme have proved rather modest, especially among lower paid workers. This is why 
the Work Budget is composed in a different, much broader way.
The newly proposed Work Budget is personal and portable, which means that the 
worker can transfer it from one job to another job. It is designed to maintain the 
worker’s employability level and can be used to finance the actual costs of training and 
schooling. The funds in this budget can also be utilised to provide additional income 
in case of job transitions, part-time retirement, training, unpaid leave, a new job or 
position with lower earnings, or setting up one’s own business. The Work Budget is 
also available to flexible workers.
Both the worker and the employer contribute to the Work Budget. Eventually the 
mandatory contribution should increase to a level of a half monthly salary per year On the Road to Flexicurity
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for workers with low and middle incomes. The contributions of the employer to the 
Work Budget should not raise overall labour costs. The most important sources for 
the employer’s contributions are current severance payments. In the new system with 
employment insurance, severance pay is paid in addition to the payments during 
the transfer period only in special situations in which employers do not meet their 
contractual  and  other  responsibilities  towards  workers  who  are  laid  off.16  Lower 
severance  payments  thus  provide  room  for  contributions  into  the  Work  Budget. 
This makes workers less vulnerable to the risk of firm-specific shocks; in the case of 
bankruptcy of the firm that employs them, workers have already received payments 
in their Work Budget.
The current system of severance pay discourages workers from moving to another 
job that better fits their talents and private circumstances because in that case they 
lose their tenure-based employment protection. In contrast to the current severance 
pay, the Work Budget is portable between jobs. hence, workers who are not satisfied 
with their current job can more easily take the initiative themselves to move to another 
employer. To illustrate, workers with a physically demanding job can transfer in time 
to another job in which they can continue to work up to a higher age. By allowing 
(especially older) workers to move more easily between jobs, the Work Budget also 
enhances employability and training because a move to a new employer is often an 
important opportunity to learn new things. Such a transition can thus enhance the 
motivation to work up to a higher age. More generally, with the portable protection of 
the Work Budget, workers become less dependent on the specific employer they work 
for. This is the next phase in the emancipation of the worker. Indeed, employment 
security and transition security replaces job security, which is increasingly difficult to 
guarantee in the face of increasing firm-specific risks arising from a more dynamic 
and competitive economy.
The idea of the Work Budget is closely connected to the recent recommendations 
of both the OECD and the IMF in their country reports on the Netherlands, to move 
from the current severance pay (which is paid ex post, i.e. after a worker is laid off) 
to a system of transferable saving accounts in which employers contribute ex ante 
(i.e. before workers make a transition). Such a reform can be expected to create a 
more flexible labour market for elderly workers in which these workers can take 
more control over their own lives and in which workers are exposed less to firm-
specific risks. In this context, both the OECD and the IMF refer to a similar reform 
in Austria in 2002, in which a system of funded severance payments (Abfertigung) 
was introduced (see e.g. OECD 2008). In cases of a standard employment contract 
(with a duration of more than one month), Austrian employers contribute a payment 
16  however, employers and employees can still agree on severance pay in private contracts. They may 
also agree on transitional arrangements during the period during which the Work Budget must be 
built up.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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equivalent to 1.53 per cent of gross pay into special funds (Mitarbeitervorsorgekassen), 
which can be accessed (after a qualifying period of three years) on job termination. 
The worker can choose to take the payment, keep it in the fund, or transfer the sum of 
money into a pension insurance fund.17
Another advantage of replacing traditional severance pay with the Work Budget is 
that it provides more incentives to high-skilled workers to maintain their employability. 
Lower skilled workers, in contrast, benefit from more employment protection. These 
workers are typically on flexible contracts and thus do not benefit from severance pay 
but would obtain employer contributions into their Work Budget. In the current system 
of employment protection, even the lower skilled workers on permanent contracts 
often do not benefit from severance pay when they are laid off. The reason is that the 
employer involved can often obtain permission from the labour office to lay off these 
workers without much compensation. Employers thus do not face much incentive to 
invest in these workers. Under the system of Employment Insurance and the Work 
Budget, the protection of workers becomes less dependent on the specific contract 
form, so that the current substantial differences in employment protection between 
those workers on flexible and permanent contracts would be narrowed. Moreover, 
protection would become stronger for low skilled workers who need it most.
Another source of funds for employer contributions into the Work Budget are the 
current contributions of the employer into the pension plans of workers. This becomes 
available as a result of the third track of the proposals of the Committee on Labour 
Market Participation. The relationship between the second and third tracks is thus 
twofold. As indicated above, the second track facilitates the third track by raising 
the employability of the labour force so that the retirement age can be increased, 
because workers can work up to a more advanced age. At the same time, by reducing 
the costs of the retirement system, the third track provides the resources to finance 
the investments in human capital and the new transition arrangements in the second 
track. By transferring the room for tax benefits from retirement saving to the Work 
Budget, the government in fact increases the uses to which tax-favoured deferred 
wages can be put. These deferred wage payments do not have to be used for retirement 
but can also be utilised to invest in human capital or to finance temporary inactivity 
earlier in the life cycle. Social partners can make agreements at sectoral or firm level 
as to which uses the Work Budget can be put.
Figure 1 summarises the possible ways in which the various parties can finance 
the Work Budget.
17  For a description and comparative discussion of the transferability of the Austrian system in 
English, see the Mutual Learning Programme of the European Commission, available at http://
www.mutual-learning-employment.net/stories/story.On the Road to Flexicurity
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figure 1. Contributions to the work budget and possible sources for these contributions
employers employees social partners government












premiums due to 
extended working 
careers/ retirement at 
later stage
Lowered social security 


















funds at sector 
level
Other sources
Funding for current Life 
Course Savings scheme 
and other fiscally 
facilitated savings 
scheme for employees
Additional tax revenues 
due to reduced 
deductions of pension 
premiums
Financial resources for 
reintegration of workers
Other sources
Source: Committee on Labour Market Participation (2008).
4.2.  ThE PROVISION OF WORK AND INCOME
If a laid-off worker does not succeed in finding a job during the transfer period 
and the subsequent period during which the sector or industry bears responsibility 
for reintegrating the worker, the worker involved can then be considered to be at a 
substantial distance from the regular labour market. In the current system, the public 
organisation  for  the  implementation  of  social  security  schemes  (UWV,  which  is 
financed at national level) has the primary responsibility for reintegrating the long-
term unemployed. The Committee on Labour Market Participation wants to shift the 
financial responsibility to the municipalities as stakeholders of the new LWI, a newly 
established one-stop Location for Work and Income at the municipality level (to be 
in operation as of 200918). As direct risk-bearers for the performance of the LWIs in 
their region, the municipalities are expected to put more pressure on the LWIs to 
reintegrate the long-term unemployed. Moreover, after being unemployed for a year, 
the individual involved must accept any job – even if this job earns substantially less 
than the previous job the individual held. The municipalities also get more discretion 
to pay temporary wage subsidies to employers who want to employ these individuals.
Another innovation is that also the self employed are eligible for the provision for 
work and income for a limited period. The income level provided is on a minimum 
18  The establishment of the LWI’s is related to the merger, on 1 January 2009, of the the Public 
Employment Service (CWI) and the social security administration and implementation organisation 
(UWV). Some hundred LWI’s (which is less than one per municipality) will be established in the 
country, offering a one stop service for all work-related matters for both job seekers and employers.Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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level. however, this provision is more generous than social assistance because there is 
no means testing – neither with regard the level of wealth nor the level of income of 
others in the household. The Committee also advocates that the length of wage-linked 
unemployment benefits is shortened to give workers more incentives to maintain 
their employability and actively seek a new job after losing a job. Together with a new 
provision for the self employed, these proposals imply that the current substantial 
differences  in  income  protection  between  employees  and  the  self  employed  are 
reduced.
The three phases within the Employment Insurance scheme can be displayed as 
follows (Figure 2):
figure 2. The three phases of the employment Insurance scheme
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5.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper discusses recent policy proposals, as developed by the Dutch Committee on 
Labour Market Participation, to reform the labour market system in the Netherlands. 
As indicated in the introduction, we portray these proposals as concrete suggestions 
to further develop, systematically, a flexicurity pathway towards better transition 
security  and  higher  labour  market  mobility.  In  a  concrete  sense,  the  proposals 
illustrate how a particular Member State, i.e. the Netherlands, can continue its own 
path towards more flexibility combined with more employment and income security 
by taking good notice of its particular path dependence (institutions, culture, political 
system) and responding to its particular challenges. The proposals are consistent with 
the traditionally high involvement of the Dutch social partners in employment and On the Road to Flexicurity
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labour market policies and the large role played by individual employers, but at the 
same time the proposals aim at re-focussing and further decentralising their efforts. 
Moreover, the approach builds on regulatory policies, based on financial incentives 
(mandatory continuation of pay during a certain period of time) that have proved 
reasonably successful in other domains of labour market policy and social security 
since the early 1990s, especially for the reduction and prevention of disability cases 
and sickness absenteeism in Dutch companies. The same holds for the various public-
private forms of collaboration, implementation and reintegration that have evolved in 
the Dutch labour market.
We argue that the approach outlined by the Committee may be considered, in 
particular, an illustration of the way the second typical flexicurity pathway, as sketched 
by the European Commission, can be mapped out and stipulated. however, a good 
deal of the proposals, in our view, also gives input to the debate on the pursuance of 
the other three flexicurity pathways, as the proposals do touch upon ways to:
–  (pathway 1) limit the gap between standard employment contracts and atypical 
contracts, by fully including flexible workforces in the proposed Employment 
Insurance and Work Budget facilities and by redesigning current employment 
protection legislation;
–  (pathway 3) specifically enhance the training and employment opportunities for 
weak groups in the labour market, including older workers, women in part-time 
employment and ethnic minorities;
–  (pathway  4)  reduce  and  prevent  long-term  benefit  dependency,  especially  in 
unemployment but also in disability schemes, as timely transitions within a job 
(e.g. to less demanding activities) can, in line with the theory of transitional 
labour markets (Schmid and Gazier 2002, Wilthagen 2002), prevent workers from 
dropping out of employment for reasons of ill-health.
It can also be argued that the proposals made do reflect the four components of 
flexicurity as identified by the European Commission (see section 2).
Admittedly, the proposals do not represent a detailed and complete blueprint, 
but rather explore a systematic approach to labour market policy innovation. A great 
many aspects and issues need to be further elaborated and considered, including 
various legal aspects, the specific nature of the often collectively experienced risk of 
unemployment compared to the more individually based risks of sickness or disability, 
the impact of the proposed employment security system on small and medium sized 
businesses and the actual consequences that the new system can be expected to have 
for specific groups such as older workers (see Pennings forthcoming).
We wish to end this concluding section by briefly addressing two major questions. 
The  first  question  is  whether  these  reform  proposals  can  be  expected  to  further 
develop Dutch flexicurity, by enhancing the adaptability of both workers and citizens. Lans Bovenberg and Ton Wilthagen
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The answer to this question is not an easy one. The Committee clearly acknowledges 
that the transformation to the new system should take place slowly and gradually. 
Support from all major stakeholders, politics, government, employers, and workers 
and their organisation, courts and various labour market services is indispensable. 
At this moment (February 2009), the debate on the proposals, which were released in 
June 2008, has not yet progressed far and the debate now ties in with the debate on the 
need for wage moderation and job rotation in view of a possible economic downturn 
as a consequence of global crisis (the credit crunch).
A second important question regards the relevancy of the proposed reform to 
other countries. Policy learning (Visser and hemerijck 1997) and mutual learning 
are  key  concepts  within  the  European  Employment  Strategy.  A  straightforward 
transplantation of a country’s policies and reform to another country is generally seen 
as impossible and undesirable. Looking for inspiration rather than imitation seems 
the best strategy in this respect (Wilthagen 2008). To illustrate, the Dutch proposals 
presented here are at certain points, especially the development of an Employment 
Insurance and the Work Budget, informed and inspired by the Austrian system of 
dismissal regulation and severance pay. Many Member States might have an interest 
in taking notice of the proposals from the viewpoint of mapping out their own distinct 
pathway towards flexicurity, especially those Member States that are considering 
offering  more  employment  and  income  security  in  their  labour  markets  while 
simultaneously encouraging job mobility and transitions, and possibly redesigning, 
in a careful and balanced way, institutions and regulations that represent too strong 
a hurdle to this.
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